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I. INTRODUCTION
Rare is the day that passes that the issue of race in criminal justice is not 
headline news.1 Police shooting cases and allegations of racial bias raise
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1 See, e.g., Laurel Eckhouse, Big Data May Be Reinforcing Racial Bias in the Criminal 
Justice System, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/big
-data-may-be-reinforcing-racial-bias-in-the-criminal-justice-system/2017/02/10/d63de518-
ee3a-11e6-9973-c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html [https://perma.cc/LG3E-JE43]; Max 
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important questions about the legitimacy of law enforcement and, more broadly, 
about our nation’s commitment to principles of equal protection.2 While 
criminal justice reform has appropriately been a high-profile concern, fixing 
criminal justice alone will not and cannot solve America’s problem with 
discrimination.3
                                                                                                                     
Ehrenfreund, Poor White Kids Are Less Likely to Go to Prison Than Rich Black Kids, WASH.
POST (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/23/poor-
white-kids-are-less-likely-to-go-to-prison-than-rich-black-kids/ [https://perma.cc/2WG6-
W4NX]; Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve, Chicago’s Racist Cops and Racist Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/opinion/chicagos-racist-cops-and-
racist-courts.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]; Lester Graham & Sandra Svoboda, 
Poor and Black More Likely to Be Wrongfully Convicted, MICH. RADIO (Nov. 3, 2016), 
http://michiganradio.org/post/poor-and-black-more-likely-be-wrongfully-convicted 
[https://perma.cc/U6SP-BSF3]; Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, What It’s Like to Be Black in 
the Criminal Justice System, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/crime/2015/08/racial_disparities_in_the_criminal_justice_system_eight_chart
s_illustrating.html [https://perma.cc/MZ5L-FTLW]; Adam Liptak, Citing Racist Testimony, 
Justices Call for New Sentencing in Texas Death Penalty Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/duane-buck-texas-death-penalty-case-
supreme-court.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
2 See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Department of Justification, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/magazine/jeff-sessions-stephen-bannon-justice-
department.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (“The next time a disturbing video 
of a police shooting surfaces, it’s easy to imagine Trump and Sessions supporting the police 
without question and directing a crackdown on protesters, especially if they’re mostly 
black.”); Megann Horstead, Experts Discuss Changing Police Perceptions During 
Naperville Forum, NAPERVILLE SUN (Feb. 23, 2017), www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/
naperville-sun/ct-nvs-league-women-voters-policing-forum-st-0224-20170223-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/8L6F-RNWA] (“Community trust in local police is a valuable commodity 
that can easily be eroded by police shootings of African-Americans and abuses elsewhere 
but also can be strengthened by re-examining procedures and forming connections with 
residents, experts said Wednesday.”); John Sharp, Mobile to Consider Forming a Citizen 
Police Advisory Council in Aftermath of Police Shooting, AL.COM (July 8, 2016), 
http://www.al.com/news/mobile/index.ssf/2016/07/mobile_to_consider_forming_a_c.html 
[https://perma.cc/N29D-E8UM] (noting that police advisory council goals include 
“[s]trengthen[ing] bonds between the Police Department and the community, thereby 
[ensuring] equal protection and service to all”); Tim Sheehan, Brand Proposes Citizen Board 
to Review Police Incidents, Improve Trust in Department, FRESNO BEE (Mar. 9, 2017), 
http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article137455133.html [https://perma.cc/7X6A-
CH33] (statement from Fresno Mayor Lee Brand) (“[The citizen board] will increase public 
confidence in the Police Department and work to strengthen and ensure the application of 
equal protection under the law for all citizens in the city of Fresno.”). 
3 Certainly, the issue of discrimination in the United States is broader than criminal 
justice, or even justice system, concerns. In recent years, discrimination in voting rights, 
LGBTQ status, equal pay for equal work, and higher education have all garnered significant 
scholarly attention. See Mario L. Barnes et al., Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the 
Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 272, 277 (2015) (suggesting a continued role for race-conscious affirmative action in 
mitigating long term racial discrimination in the United States); Anthony J. Gaughan, Has 
the South Changed? Shelby County and the Expansion of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 TEX.
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Even while criminal justice reform has been a front-page news item, 
discrimination within the civil justice system has been, at best, an 
underdeveloped area of research. Commentators like Jonathan Cardi, Alexander 
Tabarrok, and Eric Helland all lament the lack of rigorous empirical research in 
the field,4 and a brief review of available studies suggests it is an area ripe for 
further exploration.5
We therefore decided to empirically evaluate whether changes in the civil 
justice system have differing impacts on different communities and whether we 
could quantify the difference. Building on our prior research on scientific 
evidence,6 we decided to evaluate the effect of the adoption of the Daubert 
standard on filing rates within different communities, particularly communities 
of color. Once we created an extensive database and evaluated it with a fixed 
effects regression analysis, we confirmed that Daubert does have a disparate 
impact on communities of color, leading to their disproportionate exclusion 
from federal court.7
We found that when the federal system adopted the stricter standard of 
Daubert in 1993, there was a disproportionate and negative impact on filings 
from African-American plaintiffs along with a corresponding rise in filings from 
white plaintiffs.8 Yet that is not all we found. In prior work, we found that when 
a state adopted Daubert after 1993, there was a “return to federal court” effect 
                                                                                                                     
J. C.L. & C.R. 109, 122–25 (2013) (discussing the impact of voter identification laws and 
racial distrust in the United States); Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L.
REV. 151, 155, 158–63 (2016) (discussing recent cases and issues in equal protection law 
with LGBT rights); Nantiya Ruan & Nancy Reichman, Hours Equity is the New Pay Equity,
59 VILL. L. REV. 35, 37 (2014) (suggesting pay equity must also contain a component of 
scheduling equity, as a way to combat discrimination against female low wage workers in 
retail employment).
4 W. Jonathan Cardi, The Search for Racial Justice in Tort Law, in CRITICAL RACE 
REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAW 115, 120 (Gregory S. Parks et 
al. eds., 2008) (noting that existing scholarship in the area of civil justice and race “only 
scratches the surface of this important topic”); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, 
Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 
28 (2003) (“It is odd that so little attention has been paid to the role of race and poverty in 
the American tort system because the influence of race on criminal trials has been extensively 
studied . . . .”).
5 Cardi, supra note 4, at 120 (suggesting, after reviewing prior empirical work, that 
“[l]imitations inherent in all of the foregoing studies’ methodology and geographical 
restrictions and their growing datedness indicate the need for further study of racial 
disparities in tort verdicts and settlements”). See also infra Part II.B. 
6 See generally Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, Et Tu, Plaintiffs? An Empirical Analysis 
of Daubert’s Effect on Plaintiffs, and Why Gatekeeping Standards Matter (a Lot), 66 ARK.
L. REV. 975 (2013) (expanding on prior research “by applying the fixed-effect statistical 
model to a new and different dataset”); Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, The Stricter Standard: 
An Empirical Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 
(2013) (answering the question of whether Daubert had a measurable effect on expert 
admissibility).
7 See infra Part III.
8 See infra Part III.D.
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where filings rebound to pre-1993 patterns.9 Yet our analysis reveals that after 
state adoption of Daubert, there is no rebound for African-American plaintiffs; 
instead, the filing rates for black plaintiffs remain depressed.10
Our research shows that, in response to Daubert, black plaintiffs were less 
likely to file in federal court, and once they were pushed out of the civil justice 
system, they remained out. In essence, the Daubert admissibility standard 
impacts filings exactly like a method of tort reform, but only for claimants of 
color.11 This finding is new in the literature and has profoundly troubling 
implications for our national ideal of equal justice under law. Yet troubling as it 
may be, our hope is that once this and other discriminatory effects are exposed, 
it will lead to civil justice reform to enhance the legitimacy of the justice system 
overall. In that regard, our research blends seamlessly with reform efforts in the 
criminal justice area.12
To assess these issues, we begin in Part II with a review of studies in civil 
justice, exploring both theoretical and empirical work with a focus on 
perceptions of civil justice by communities of color and women claimants. In 
Part III, we explain our research model, which measures the impact of changes 
in civil justice rules—specifically the gatekeeping standard for scientific 
evidence—on different communities. We demonstrate how we designed the 
research, created a database which incorporates U.S. Census demographic 
information, and how the results demonstrate that changes to civil justice rules 
in general, and to scientific admissibility standards in particular, can have a 
disproportionate and negative effect on communities of color. In fact, the 
changes suggest that Daubert can and does act on these communities as a type 
of tort reform measure, restricting access to civil justice and stoking the crisis 
of the legitimacy for civil justice within those communities. We finish in Part 
IV with a discussion of the implications of our findings and preliminary 
suggestions about policy prescriptions in response to them. 
By empirically testing the effect of the Daubert standard on communities of 
color, we measured the disproportionate impact it has on those communities, 
                                                                                                                     
9 Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 1002; Jurs & DeVito, CATH. U. L.
REV., supra note 6, at 701–02.
10 See infra Part III.D.
11 For a more detailed discussion of the empirical assessment of tort reform, see infra
Part IV.A; see also Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to a Nonexistent Problem: 
Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 
103–09 (2015) (finding that after a tort reform damages cap is removed, there is not a 
rebound effect and filings continue to decline).
12 Regarding criminal justice reforms and their intent to enhance legitimacy of the 
system, see, for example, STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 144–
50 (2012) (advocating for reforms to enhance legitimacy of law enforcement); Anthony A. 
Braga, Better Policing Can Improve Legitimacy and Reduce Mass Incarceration, 129 HARV.
L. REV. F. 233, 233 (2016); Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 90–91 (2004) (noting that “[l]egitimacy-based policing has clear 
advantages for the police and the community” and suggesting reforms to enhance police 
legitimacy). 
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which underscores a long-standing crisis of legitimacy in state courts but also 
suggests more broadly that changes in civil justice should be reviewed for 
disparate impacts prior to their adoption.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH ON CIVIL JUSTICE AND RACE
Civil justice remains an underexplored area of research and analysis, but it 
is not entirely undeveloped. Before discussing our statistical analysis, we will 
first discuss prior work on issues of civil justice and race, starting with 
commentary from a theoretical perspective. Afterwards, we will examine prior 
empirical research assessing civil justice and race, along with a brief review of 
statistical research in the Daubert field. Ultimately, we agree with Professors 
Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok’s insight that “[i]t is odd that so little 
attention has been paid to the role of race and poverty in the American tort 
system.”13
A. Theoretical Scholarship on Race and Civil Justice–A Call to Arms
The impact of race on civil litigation is a multifaceted issue, one that 
multiple commentators have evaluated, unpacked, and discussed in recent 
scholarship in the field. In these pieces, the commentators frequently lament the 
lack of more detailed empirical analysis of the effect of race on civil litigation.14
Yet even without a more solid empirical footing, the commentary has 
illuminated a serious concern of discrimination within the civil justice system. 
Most recent commentary in the field discusses the current state of affairs 
with civil justice, but the historical trend also shows the issue is not a new one. 
In her study reviewing legal decisions from the first half of the twentieth 
century, Jennifer Wriggins found that tort claim values have been influenced by 
race in the past and continue to be affected by race even today.15 By comparing 
awards in wrongful death cases, Wriggins concluded that “financial 
contributions of black decedents, their pain and suffering, and the grief of black 
survivors, at times, were weighed more lightly than similar harms suffered by 
whites.”16 She suggests the disparity can be partially explained by negative 
                                                                                                                     
13 Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 4, at 28.
14 Cardi, supra note 4, at 120; Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: 
Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 773 (1996); Jennifer B. Wriggins, 
Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900–1949, 49 HOW. L.J. 99, 135 (2005). Empirical 
researchers echo this point. See text accompanying note 10.
15 Wriggins, supra note 14, at 130 (measuring effect of race on tort claims using a 
variety of methodological approaches). Wriggins expanded upon this analysis in a 2007 
essay in The Review of Litigation. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: 
Thoughts on Race and Remedies, 1865–2007, 27 REV. LITIG. 37, 44–46 (2007) (adding 
factors of access to attorneys and use of race-based compensation tables to earlier assessment 
of race and damages in tort). 
16 Wriggins, supra note 14, at 130.
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racial/racist generalizations,17 but also by assumptions about family structure18
that disproportionately affect black claimants and by the use of segregated 
precedents devaluing claims based on past practices.19 While the cases reviewed 
involved claimants before 1950, Wriggins makes clear that devaluation of injury 
to people of color is not only a historical fact, but is also something we must 
remain vigilant to identify and correct.20
Just as racialized precedents in law could reduce damage awards to people 
of color in the past, other commentators have suggested that precedents for 
damages—specifically damage valuation tables—have resulted in disparate 
awards for people of color and women in modern litigation. In 2005, Professor 
Martha Chamallas described how her work on task forces addressing 
discrimination in the justice system led to her discovery that experts calculating 
damage awards using race- and gender-based tables is “commonplace.”21
Calculation of damages by use of these gendered or racialized tables has the 
effect of reducing recoveries by providing different baseline assumptions on 
work/life expectancy and also on annual income.22 By use of these tables, 
Professor Chamallas illustrates this concern with the case of United States v. 
Bedonie, where a civil damage award in a wrongful death case was explicitly 
reduced from a baseline of $744,000 to $433,000 based solely on the plaintiff’s
status as a Native American man (who, on average, earn only 58% of the 
earnings of white men).23 In response, Chamallas argues in favor of damages 
calculations based on “blended tables” created without regard to race or 
gender,24 while arguing downward adjustments on damages violate equal 
protection.25
Chamallas and Wriggins joined forces to write a detailed examination at 
gender and racial discrimination throughout tort law in their monograph, The 
Measure of Injury.26 Building upon Wriggins’ work on historical damages and 
                                                                                                                     
17 Id. at 127–29.
18 Id. at 115–17.
19 Id. at 124–26.
20 Id. at 138. 
21 Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the 
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2005). 
22 Id. at 1438–39; see also Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant 
Statistics: The Unwitting Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L.
REV. 771, 801–10 (2010) (starting with review of Chamallas’s work on race- and gender-
based tables, but providing additional examples of misuse of these statistics and noting that 
“using those tables reinforces the harm caused by wrongful discrimination”). 
23 Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1439–40. Chamallas notes a similar damages 
devaluation in the same case, reducing damages for wrongful death of a Native American 
woman from $308,000 to $171,000. Id.
24 Id. at 1441–43 (reviewing how race and gender tables violate equal protection law).
25 Id. at 1450 (advocating for the use of blended tables). 
26 See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF 
INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010) (showing how gender and racial hierarchy 
affect tort law).
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Chamallas’s work on gender- and race-based tables for modern damages 
calculations, they conclude that all aspects of tort law have been affected by 
discrimination: “The mapping of gender onto the debate over physical versus 
mental harm, the operation of white racial privilege, and the devaluation of 
claims brought by racial minorities are dynamics that have shaped the law of 
intentional torts, negligence, causation, and damages.”27 In response, they 
suggest a broad incorporation of civil rights principles into tort law in order to 
“weave gender and race equality into basic tort law principles,”28 while also 
expanding compensable harms to include reproductive, sexual and other gender-
associated concerns currently undervalued or excluded by historical legacy.29
Broadening the inquiry further, Frank McClellan argues that in addition to 
the direct harm to injured parties undercompensated due to race or gender 
discrimination identified by Wriggins and Chamallas, there is also a public harm 
component to discriminatory practices in tort law.30 He believes that race has an 
impact “on every aspect of a tort claim, adversely affecting lawyers, clients, and 
the public conception of justice.”31 So while it is clear that the individual tort
claimant does worse in a discriminatory civil justice system—a harm that merits 
attention and must be systematically eliminated—there is also a public harm 
when we as a society allow private bias to control the public system of civil 
justice.32 In essence, permitting those biases to affect results in court 
unequivocally reduces the perception of legitimacy of the justice system.33
Independent of the individual and public harms of a discriminatory tort 
regime, W. Jonathan Cardi also suggests that the harm also undermines the 
theoretical underpinnings of tort law, from either a corrective justice or law-and-
economics approach.34 If discrimination affects damages awards, then the 
overall effect must be that tort-related social policy will be suboptimal in light 
of the goals of tort to compensate those wronged and deter wrongdoers from 
other harms.35 Cardi also comprehensively reviews the state of empirical 
research in the field of torts and notes, “Limitations inherent in all of the 
foregoing studies’ methodology and geographical restrictions and their growing 
datedness indicate the need for further study of racial disparities in tort verdicts 
and settlements. Indeed, existing scholarship only scratches the surface of this 
important topic.”36
                                                                                                                     
27 Id. at 61.
28 Id. at 188.
29 Id. at 190 (supporting expansion of compensable harms to include claims of 
particular importance to women and people of color).
30 See McClellan, supra note 14, at 772.
31 Id. (emphasis added).
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 Cardi, supra note 4, at 116. 
35 Id.
36 Id. at 120.
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The most recent analysis of discriminatory damages calculations, by Ronen 
Avraham in 2015, expands upon Cardi’s discussion of the theoretical 
underpinnings of tort law.37 Just as with Chamallas’s work a decade earlier, 
Avraham identifies the use of race- and gender-based tables for damages 
calculation as a source of individual discrimination, but also as a source of 
negative systematic effects.38 For example, he suggests that a rational manager 
of a bus transportation company could limit their liability by assigning their 
riskier drivers to work routes with more women and people of color, since the 
law currently makes it “cheaper for school bus companies to have accidents 
involving black girls than accidents involving white boys.”39 In response to this 
shocking situation, Avraham suggests that when one considers the theoretical 
underpinnings of tort law—corrective justice, distributive justice, and 
efficiency—the use of blended tables better supports the goals of the law.40 This 
is true regardless of whether the tables currently used are accurate, although 
Avraham suggests that there are many reasons to think they are not.41 In 
response, courts should require blended tables in the determination of tort 
damages,42 and he notes a single example of a federal district judge—Judge 
Weinstein of the Southern District of New York—who has done so.43 In 
addition to his analysis and proposed solution, Avraham also—as Cardi and 
others have before him—lamented the lack of attention race and gender 
discrimination in tort law (and civil justice in general) have received, calling it 
a “great embarrassment”44 and a “problem [that] can no longer be ignored.”45
B. Empirical Research on Race and Civil Justice—A Tale of Two 
Systems
While Cardi and Avraham may be right that empirical investigation into 
discrimination in the civil justice system is sorely needed, those studies that are 
available have led to significant insights into the state of affairs in courtrooms 
today.46 Dividing the existing research on race and civil justice into coherent 
pieces, broadly speaking, there are several nationally-focused empirical 
research studies and then a collection of state-level inquiries authored mainly 
                                                                                                                     
37 RONEN AVRAHAM, IS RACE- AND SEX-BASED TARGETING EFFICIENT? A CLOSER 
LOOK AT TORT LAW’S DISCRIMINATORY DAMAGE AWARDS 8, 11 (2015), https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Ronen-Avraham_Is-Race-and-Sex-
Based-Targeting-Efficient-A-Closer-Look-at-Tort-Law%E2%80%99s-Discriminatory-
Damage-Awards.pdf [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
38 Id.
39 Id. at 5.
40 Id. at 8–9, 33–55.
41 Id. at 9–10.
42 See id. at 10, 65.
43 See AVRAHAM, supra note 37, at 20.
44 Id. at 2.
45 Id. at 11. 
46 See infra Part II.B.1.
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by committees on race and justice appointed by individual state supreme 
courts.47 In examining this research, we can see that significant evidence already 
exists of discriminatory effects in the civil justice system.
1. National Studies
Many of the national studies review the issue of civil justice as one part of 
an overall investigation into perceptions of the entire justice system. In 
explicitly evaluating the issue of race and civil justice, only two different 
research groups—relying on a single unified dataset—evaluate the concern: Eric 
Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, with their 2003 article, Race, Poverty, and 
American Tort Awards,48 and Theodore Eisenberg and Martin Wells, with a 
2002 article, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There a Bronx Effect?49 In 
both studies, the researchers relied on the same massive database created from 
combining census data from 1980 and 1990 with secondary sources reporting 
tort awards from both state and federal courts between 1979 and 2000.50 Once 
they analyzed the data, though, only Helland and Tabarrok could find 
statistically significant differences in damage awards based on race.51
Helland and Tabarrok began with the dataset on federal and state jury 
verdicts and then analyzed it using a regression analysis to measure the effect 
of race and income in the jury pool on damage awards.52 They found that when 
people of color as a percentage of the jury pool increased, and when the 
percentage of people of color in poverty increased in that jury pool, there was a 
statistically significant increase in tort damage awards.53 For each percentage 
increase in the jury pool of people who are both black and in poverty, as defined 
by census data, Helland and Tabarrok found a 3%–10% increase in tort damage 
awards.54 The increase in awards may be as high as 7% for Hispanic jury pools 
with high poverty rates, based on census data, but the authors urge caution in 
that analysis due to weaknesses in the data.55 In contrast, an increase in the 
percentage of the jury pool who is white and in poverty, as defined by census 
data, results in a 2%–3% decrease in tort damage awards.56 While the 
researchers suggest that these data represent significant changes in jury behavior 
due to demographics, they caution that they are unable to report on the actual 
                                                                                                                     
47 See infra Part II.B.2.
48 Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 4, at 27–28.
49 Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There 
a Bronx Effect?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1839–40 (2002). 
50 Id. at 1843–46; Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 4, at 29–33.
51 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 49, at 1839–40, 1869; Helland & Tabarrok, supra
note 4, at 46–47. See infra text accompanying notes 55–57, 59–64.
52 Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 4, at 37, 40 tbl.6. 
53 Id. at 43–45.
54 Id. at 46.
55 Id. at 47.
56 Id. at 46.
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composition of juries (instead of the jury pool), nor can they separate out effects 
for race independent of poverty and race due to inherent data weaknesses.57
Nonetheless, the study is an important assessment of race and civil justice and 
stands nearly alone in explicit analysis of solely that issue.
The only other study to assess the issue directly, by Eisenberg and Wells, 
did not find statistically significant effects based on race.58 Using the same 
dataset as Helland and Tabbarok,59 Eisenberg and Wells performed multiple 
regression analyses to test the folk wisdom that people of color “favor injured 
plaintiffs and give them inflated awards.”60 Yet in almost every analysis they 
ran, the researchers could not find a statistically significant effect due to race. 
They could find no effect of race on win rates or damages awards, in either state 
or federal court.61 When they assessed the data using a more focused 
multivariable analysis, they again found no statistically significant effect of race 
on damages or win rates, in either state or federal court.62 In fact, the only 
statistically significant effect Eisenberg and Wells found related to the win rate 
for federal jury trials when the cause of action was limited to torts and the 
sample was limited to urban populations.63 Within the context of so many 
findings that failed to meet significance, Eisenberg and Wells then spend several 
pages suggesting reasons for the finding,64 before conceding that they “find little 
robust evidence that a trial locale’s population demographics help explain jury 
trial outcomes.”65
Other national-level research examining race and civil justice tends to treat 
the issue as one subset of the overall assessment of the broader impact of race 
on overall justice. As such, it can be of limited applicability to the civil justice 
context, and yet the research shows a stark contrast between experiences in the 
justice system of whites and people of color. 
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) 1999 national survey 
demonstrates this concern in stark terms.66 When the NCSC surveyed over 
1,800 Americans of all backgrounds about the justice system, many respondents 
believed that people of color are treated worse by the system than others, 
although the percentage varies widely between respondents of different 
backgrounds.67 Among black respondents, the percentage who believed they are 
                                                                                                                     
57 Id. at 41, 52 (discussing difficulty in establishing distinction between race effects on 
damages and race-and-poverty effects, due to the limitations on the data). 
58 Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 49, at 1839–40, 1869.
59 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
60 See Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 49, at 1839, 1843–46.
61 Id. at 1852 tbl.1. 
62 Id. at 1856 tbl.2, 1858 tbl.3. 
63 Id. at 1861, 1862 tbl.4. 
64 Id. at 1865–68.
65 Id. at 1869. 
66 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999
NATIONAL SURVEY 43 (1999), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctco
mm/id/17 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
67 Id. at 37.
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treated worse than others is over 68%, as compared to about 40% of whites who 
agree with that sentiment.68 It is not hard to see why, when black respondents 
are more likely to believe judges and juries are not representative of the 
community,69 and less likely to believe judges are honest and fair70 or that court 
personnel are helpful and courteous.71 Based on the survey data, the NCSC 
report concludes that black Americans are “clearly estranged from the courts.”72
A 2000 follow-up survey concurs with that sentiment.73 For that research, 
the authors collected about 1,600 responses from a variety of demographic 
groups, asking about fairness of court procedures and court outcomes.74 When 
asked about outcomes of cases, a majority (57%) of whites who had no contact 
with the court system agreed outcomes are always or usually fair compared to 
only 21% of black respondents who also had no contact with the court system. 
Furthermore, over thirty percent of black respondents believed outcomes are 
seldom or never fair.75 Similarly, when asked about court procedures, 64% of 
whites without court contact believed procedures are always or usually fair, 
while only 27% of black respondents agreed (and 54% responded that courts are 
sometimes fair).76 In addition to these contrasts, when asked directly if black 
litigants are treated worse than other litigants, only 23% of whites believed that 
this happened either always or often, while a majority of black respondents 
(52%) agreed.77 As with the 1999 NCSC study, the researchers concluded 
ultimately that “African-Americans are estranged from the court system.”78
A 2015 NCSC follow-up study indicated that this racial gap has yet to 
close.79 Based on 1,000 survey responses, the study found that a majority still 
believe African-Americans are treated poorly in the judicial system.80 African-
American responses rated lower on issues of trust and fairness in the system, 
with only 52% believing in the fairness of their direct experience with the 
system compared to seventy percent of white respondents.81 Significantly to the 
                                                                                                                     
68 Id. at 38.
69 See id. at 29.
70 Id. at 30.
71 Id. at 26.
72 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 66, at 43.
73 DAVID B. ROTTMAN & RANDALL M. HANSEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW 
RECENT COURT USERS VIEW THE STATE COURTS: PERCEPTIONS OF WHITES, AFRICAN-
AMERICANS, AND LATINOS 18 (2001), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collect
ion/ctcomm/id/18 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
74 Id. at 3–4.
75 Id. at 5 tbl.1.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 11 tbl.9. 
78 Id. at 18.
79 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SURVEY OF REGISTERED 
VOTERS 1 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Public%20Trust%20and
%20Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx [https://perma.cc/KM7M-JKHJ]. 
80 Id. at 1, 4.
81 Id. at 4.
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research model we developed, the survey responses demonstrate that the 
perception of unfairness and mistrust that is prevalent in state courts does not 
exist for federal courts: “There is no racial gap on the U.S. Supreme Court or 
the federal court system.”82
Research on the role of race on civil justice at the national level remains—
perhaps as a result of the difficulty of research design in the field83—largely 
undeveloped, with most studies tangentially addressing the issue in a broader 
assessment of overall justice system concerns.
2. State-Specific Studies
While the role of race on civil justice remains an underdeveloped area for 
national studies, states have filled the gap by appointing race and justice 
commissions to research and analyze the issue. Many of these studies support 
the stark racial gap in trust in the justice system seen in the National Center for 
State Courts (NCSC) data.84
Unlike many of the later works, the first jurisdiction-specific study to 
address race and civil justice came from the RAND Corporation rather than a 
state commission.85 Audrey Chin and Mark Peterson assessed the outcomes in 
over 9,000 civil cases in Cook County, Illinois, in their 1985 study Deep 
Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in Cook County Jury Trials.86 They found 
evidence of systematic bias against people of color in all stages of litigation. 
Chin and Peterson found that women and African Americans are much less 
likely to be plaintiffs in a case in the first place, and even when they are, are less 
likely to claim severe or disabling injuries.87 As litigants, black claimants lost 
more often than whites,88 and those that won their claim received smaller 
damage awards, on average 74% less than white claimants.89 Black defendants 
lost more too.90 Based on these stark findings, Chin and Peterson concluded that 
                                                                                                                     
82 Id.
83 Wriggins, supra note 14, at 135.
84 See supra text accompanying notes 66–72, 79–82.
85 See generally AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3249.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3EF-YZ3N] (finding evidence of systematic bias against people of color 
at all stages of litigation).
86 Id. at v.
87 Id. at vi, 16.
88 See id. at viii, 26.
89 See id. at viii, 30. 
90 Id. at viii, 26 tbl.3.6. Counter-intuitively compared to the other data, the black 
defendants who do lose their claims pay less, on average, than white defendants. CHIN &
PETERSON, supra note 85, at 29. 
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“[l]itigants’ race seemed to have a pervasive influence on the outcomes of civil 
jury trials in Cook County.”91
The RAND Corporation study appears to be the catalyst for state 
exploration of the same issue in the years following its publication. New Jersey 
may have been first, formally establishing its Task Force on Minority Concerns 
in 1985.92 By 1988, enough states had formed commissions on racial and ethnic 
bias in the justice system that a national conference on the issue was held to 
streamline future research efforts in those and in other states.93 In general, a state 
supreme court would create a commission or committee to examine the issue of 
fairness in the judicial system, and then the committee would collect data 
through public hearings, individual interviews, and surveys.94
A large number of commission reports would be published in the years 
immediately following that convention, as the issue garnered significant 
attention; the frequency of reports has slowed significantly in recent years.95 As 
                                                                                                                     
91 Id. at viii. The researchers also suggested the issues raised by their work require 
additional empirical study. Id. at 62.
92 N.J. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON MINORITY CONCERNS, FINAL REPORT 1 (June 
1992). 
93 Arline S. Tyler & Steven Montano, State Panels Document Racial, Ethnic Bias in 
the Courts, 78 JUDICATURE 154, 154 (1994). 
94 See, e.g., STATE OF IOWA EQUAL. IN THE COURTS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
EQUALITY IN THE COURTS TASK FORCE 1 (1993) (discussing the appointment of the Task 
Force by the Iowa Supreme Court) [hereinafter IOWA TASK FORCE REPORT].
95 N.D. COMM’N TO STUDY RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS, N.D. SUPREME 
COURT, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (June 2012) [hereinafter NORTH DAKOTA 
COMMISSION REPORT]; S.D. EQUAL JUSTICE COMM’N, S.D. SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2006); COMM’N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS, MD. COURT OF APPEALS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
FAIRNESS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (June 2004); NEB. MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK FORCE,
STATE JUSTICE INST., FINAL REPORT (Jan. 2003); PA. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON RACIAL &
GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYS., FINAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT 
COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2003) [hereinafter 
PENNSYLVANIA COMMITTEE REPORT]; IND. SUPREME COURT COMM’N ON RACE & GENDER 
FAIRNESS, IND. SUPREME COURT, EXECUTIVE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Dec. 2002);
TASK FORCE ON RACIAL & ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE LEGAL SYS., UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS: REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (Sept. 2000); OHIO COMM’N ON RACIAL FAIRNESS, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N,
THE REPORT OF THE OHIO COMMISSION ON RACIAL FAIRNESS (1999); COLO. SUPREME COURT 
MULTICULTURAL COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE (June 1998); ALASKA 
SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIRNESS & ACCESS, STATE JUSTICE INST., REPORT 
OF THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIRNESS AND ACCESS (Oct.
1997); TENN. SUPREME COURT COMM’N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE COURT 
SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC FAIRNESS (Feb. 1997) [hereinafter TENNESSEE COMMISSION REPORT]; STATE OF 
CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH TASK FORCE ON MINORITY FAIRNESS, FINAL REPORT (Apr. 1996) 
[hereinafter CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE REPORT]; CAL. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY 
COMM. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS IN THE COURTS, FAIRNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA STATE 
COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC, ATTORNEYS AND COURT PERSONNEL (Dec. 1993) 
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with the NCSC’s national research, these reports generally address issues of 
civil justice as one component of larger systematic problems in the courts.96 Just 
as with the NCSC’s research, the state commission reports collectively 
demonstrate significant concerns about the justice system providing equal 
justice under the law.97
Without reviewing the specific findings of each state’s reports, several 
broad conclusions can be reached about the collective findings of the state 
commissions as a whole. On the issue of discrimination in the judicial system, 
survey respondents in every state showed concern about fairness in their state. 
For example, when researchers asked citizens about fairness in the court system, 
nearly 47% of respondents in Florida disagreed with the sentiment that courts 
treat whites and people of color the same (with 39% agreeing),98 while in 
California 72% of black respondents believe the courts were unfair.99 The 
concern with fairness applies to court professionals as well. In the State of 
Washington, clear majorities of both judges (55%) and attorneys (62%) said that 
people of color see themselves as disadvantaged in civil cases,100 while the 
number of attorneys of color who believe a similar sentiment rises to nearly 68%
in New York101 and 70% in Iowa.102 These numbers are both shocking, to see 
that disparities of treatment are widespread, and typical, in that every state court 
commission on fairness found some similar evidence in their analysis.
                                                                                                                     
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE REPORT]; IOWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 94; 
MINN. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 
(May 1993) [hereinafter MINNESOTA TASK FORCE REPORT]; THE FAIRNESS & EQUAL. COMM.
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO, REPORT OF THE FAIRNESS AND EQUALITY COMMITTEE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO (1992); N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES,
N.Y. COURT OF APPEALS, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON 
MINORITIES (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter NEW YORK COMMISSION REPORT]; WASH. STATE
MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK FORCE, WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 
1990) [hereinafter WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT]; N.J. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON 
MINORITY CONCERNS, INTERIM REPORT (1989) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY COMMITTEE 
INTERIM REPORT]; TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC ISSUES IN THE COURTS, MICH. SUPREME 
COURT, FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC 
ISSUES IN THE COURTS (Dec. 1989); Georgia Supreme Court Commission on Racial & Ethnic 
Bias in the Court System, Let Justice Be Done: Equally, Fairly, and Impartially, 12 GA. ST.
L. REV. 687, 694–97 (1996); Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in 
the Judicial System, Report of the Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic 
Issues in the Judicial System, 73 OR. L. REV. 823, 830–34 (1994) [hereinafter Oregon Task 
Force Report]; Florida Supreme Court Racial & Ethnic Bias Study Commission, Report and 
Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission,
19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 604–05 (1991) [hereinafter Florida Bias Commission Report].
96 See supra text accompanying notes 66–72, 79–82.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 66–72, 79–82.
98 FLORIDA JUDICIAL MGMT. COUNCIL, COMM. ON COMMC’N & PUB. OP., FLORIDA 
STATEWIDE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 12 (July 1996).
99 CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 95, at 4-27 fig.4-27. 
100 WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 95, at 45.
101 NEW YORK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 95, at 188 tbl.II.4.2.
102 IOWA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 94, at 43. 
2018] A TALE OF TWO DAUBERTS 1121
Part of the problem may relate to the relative paucity of people of color as 
the fact finders within the judicial system, either as judges or jurors. In 1990, 
only 5.5% of judges in the State of Florida were people of color, and only two 
judges of color statewide served at an appellate level.103 In California, a majority 
of people of color responding to the survey believed that minority defendants 
“seldom” receive a hearing before a jury of their peers,104 while in Minnesota, 
the commission concluded that “jury pools rarely, if ever, are representative of 
the racial composition of our communities.”105 One reason for this may be the 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.106 In Tennessee, survey data 
suggested that attorneys commonly strike people of color from jury panels;107
in Connecticut, 74% of attorneys of color believed that systematic use of 
peremptory challenges in this way, while an even higher percentage (83%) of 
people of color serving as employees of the court system agreed.108
Since the survey responses and public hearings show a stark pattern of 
perceived discrimination against people of color in the justice system overall, 
the state commissions were unflinching in their criticism of the status quo. New 
York’s Commission concluded that “[r]educed to their essence, the numerous 
complaints, testimony and comments received by the Commission reflect the 
perception that minorities are stripped of their human dignity, their 
individuality, and their identity in their encounters with the court system.”109
However degrading and discriminatory the treatment may be, the commissions 
did not find them to be based on overt racism. As the Oregon Commission 
found, “[w]hile overt, intended discrimination against minorities by 
nonminority judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and court staff is not common, strong 
evidence demonstrates that racial minorities are at a disadvantage in virtually 
                                                                                                                     
103 Florida Bias Commission Report, supra note 95, at 613. These numbers improved by 
the time the Commission issued their follow-up report in December 2000, to 14.7% of judges 
of color overall, with two justices of color on the seven-member Florida Supreme Court. 
RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS COMM’N, FLA. SUPREME COURT, “WHERE THE INJURED FLY FOR 
JUSTICE”: A TEN-YEAR RETROSPECT ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION 3 (Dec. 2000). 
104 CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 95, at 4-51 fig.4-59.
105 MINNESOTA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 95, at S-13. A similar finding can be 
found in Pennsylvania’s report, where lack of diversity on juries led to a perceived lack of 
empathy for minority claimants and therefore lower damages awards. PENNSYLVANIA 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 95, at 246.
106 Of course, use of peremptory challenges in this manner violates equal protection 
under the Constitution. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) 
(holding that peremptory challenges in this manner violates equal protection in civil cases), 
and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that the use of peremptory 
challenges in this manner violates equal protection in criminal cases). 
107 TENNESSEE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 95, at 42–43.
108 CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 95, at CIV-5. 
109 NEW YORK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 95, at 10.
1122 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:6
all aspects of the Oregon court system.”110 Tennessee’s Commission agreed, 
stating:
The findings and conclusion of the Commission show, in the main, that 
problems experienced by racial and ethnic minority persons in their interaction 
with the justice system rarely stem from overt acts of mistreatment or 
disrespect. Nor do explicit manifestations of racial bias abound. Rather, as the 
Commission has found, institutional bias is relentlessly at work.111
Yet whether the source of the discriminatory treatment is overt racism or 
systematic bias compounding upon itself, it sends a clear message to litigants: 
people of color are not welcome in the system. This finding is pervasive in the 
state commission reports. New Jersey’s Committee explicitly found that the 
findings of disparate treatment led to a “reluctance on the part of at least some 
minority groups to seek justice in the civil courts.”112 Washington’s Task Force 
found that “[m]inorities believe that bias pervades the entire legal system in 
general and hence, they do not trust the court system to resolve their disputes or 
administer justice even-handedly.”113 New York’s Commission concluded that 
perceptions of a racially biased court system “may deter minorities from 
affirmatively using the courts to seek legal redress.”114 Pennsylvania found that 
the effect of concerns regarding equal treatment has been “to deter plaintiffs 
from filing their cases in state court.”115 In the most recent report to date, North 
Dakota pronounced succinctly that “[i]f such mistrust holds for civil cases, 
minorities may simply refrain from use of the [state] civil court system.”116
The combined findings of the state commissions on fairness in the judicial 
system track closely with the suspicions first encountered in the NCSC’s
national survey responses: people of color do not receive equal access to the 
judicial system in the United States.117 The survey data led many of the state 
commissions to find explicitly that the failure of the judicial system to give equal 
protection of the law has led people of color to foreswear use of state civil justice 
system altogether.118
C. Empirical Research on Effect of Daubert in Civil Justice
As we will discuss in Part III, our analysis focuses on one particular civil 
justice change—the adoption of the Daubert standard for expert admissibility—
and measures how it affects different groups of claimants. Before we quantify 
                                                                                                                     
110 Oregon Task Force Report, supra note 95, at 828–29 (footnote omitted).
111 TENNESSEE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 95, at 5.
112 NEW JERSEY COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 95, at 100–01. 
113 WASHINGTON TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 95, at xxi. 
114 NEW YORK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 95, at 12.
115 PENNSYLVANIA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 95, at 231.
116 NORTH DAKOTA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 95, at 113.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 79–83.
118 See supra text accompanying notes 112–116.
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that effect on different groups of claimants, we will first review prior empirical 
work measuring Daubert’s overall effect. These efforts include both statistical 
and survey research. 
In a series of surveys from the 1990s, research groups led by Sophia 
Gatowski and Carol Krafka found that judges had no clear consensus on 
Daubert’s effect on evidence admissibility.119 Surveying state court judges, 
Gatowski et al asked judges whether Daubert raised, lowered, or didn’t change 
the standard for evidence admissibility, as compared to the alternative Frye
test.120 The responses show no clear consensus.121 The largest response group 
of 36% said Daubert was not intended to raise or lower standards, while 23% 
said it lowered the bar for admission and 32% said it raised standards.122 While 
state court judges were unsure of Daubert’s true effect on evidence 
admissibility, Krafka’s survey of federal judges found that one-third of the 
judges were more likely to exclude evidence after Daubert.123 A more recent 
survey of state court judges by one of these authors found that, when asked 
directly whether Frye or Daubert is stricter, judges chose Daubert but not
overwhelmingly.124 The result is different when judges are split based on their 
home-state standard; Frye judges were evenly split on the question, but 87% of 
Daubert judges believed their home state is stricter.125 Considering these 
responses collectively, surveys cannot yet definitively describe the effect of 
Daubert.
Statistical research in the decade after Daubert was similarly equivocal. In 
2001, Lloyd Dixon and Brian Gill evaluated reported case decisions in Westlaw, 
to decide if Daubert had an effect on expert admissibility.126 They concluded 
that judges’ standards for reliability had tightened in civil cases after Daubert
in 1993, stating: “[J]udges scrutinized reliability more carefully and applied 
stricter standards in deciding whether to admit expert evidence.”127 A study by 
Jennifer Groscup and her colleagues examined Daubert’s effect on criminal 
cases using a similar methodology, but concluded that “no change in the overall 
                                                                                                                     
119 Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 433 (2001); 
see Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding 
Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 322–23 (2002). 
120 Gatowski et al., supra note 119, at 443. 
121 See id.
122 Id.
123 Krafka et al., supra note 119, at 329.
124 See Andrew Jurs, Gatekeeper with a Gavel: A Survey Evaluating Judicial 
Management of Challenges to Expert Reliability and Their Relationship to Summary 
Judgment, 83 MISS. L.J. 325, 365–66 (2014).
125 Id.
126 LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE 
DAUBERT DECISION 15–19 (2001).
127 Id. at 61; see also id. at 28–29 (suggesting that standards for reliability became 
stricter in the years after Daubert).
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rate of admission for all types of expert evidence was observed.”128 One other 
study, by Albert Yoon and Edward Cheng in 2005, used a profoundly different 
methodology; they proposed to measure Daubert’s true effect by examining 
filings before and after the adoption of the standard, instead of by reviewing 
case reports as Dixon/Gill and Groscup had done.129 When they did so, they 
concluded that the legal standard for admission of evidence had no effect on 
filings and therefore made no difference.130
Having reviewed these studies, and frustrated with their equivocation, the 
authors of this paper also assessed the Daubert question using a method of 
quantitative case filing analysis similar to Cheng and Yoon.131 Those studies 
depended on a natural experiment presented by our two-tiered judicial system. 
When the federal system adopted Daubert in 1993, it did so independently of 
state court systems, thus we could measure changes in case filing rates in 
response to that initial shift.132 The experiment also contains a built-in quality 
control mechanism because we could also measure the changes in case filings 
for state adoption of a Daubert standard after 1993 when both systems would 
again have the same standard.133
Using this natural experiment as our study design, we found that both civil 
plaintiffs and defendants act in ways that demonstrate that Daubert is perceived 
as a stricter standard than the Frye standard. When faced with a venue choice 
between a federal court using Daubert and a state court using Frye, plaintiffs 
will flee to state court to enjoy the friendlier Frye venue.134 On the other hand, 
civil defendants are more likely to remove a case to a federal Daubert court than 
to leave it in a Frye state court.135 We measured first these initial shifts in 
reaction to uneven scientific admissibility standard after Daubert in 1993, but 
ran our built-in quality control experiment by measuring litigants’ reactions to 
state adoption of Daubert after 1993.136 We found that once a state adopts 
Daubert, so that scientific admissibility standards of state and federal venues 
                                                                                                                     
128 Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 363 
(2002).
129 See Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 482 (2005).
130 Id. at 503 (“[A] state’s adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in 
practice.”).
131 See Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 994–1000 (discussing the 
methodology of analysis for determining the effect of Daubert on litigant actions); Jurs & 
DeVito, CATH. U. L. REV., supra note 6, at 716–28 (discussing this same methodology).
132 See Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 1000–01; Jurs & DeVito, CATH.
U. L. REV., supra note 6, at 727–28. 
133 See Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 998–99; Jurs & DeVito, CATH. U.
L. REV., supra note 6, at 700–01.
134 Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 1000–01.
135 See Jurs & DeVito, CATH. U. L. REV., supra note 6, at 699.
136 See Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 1003; Jurs & DeVito, CATH. U. L.
REV., supra note 6, at 731
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are equal, the venue choices of civil plaintiffs and removal choices of civil 
defendants revert to the status quo.137 These macro-level effects demonstrated 
that, in the aggregate and over millions of cases from 1990 to 2000, Daubert is 
perceived as stricter, and civil litigants on both sides act accordingly.
Yet even with the macro analysis we performed, we knew that these overall 
effects could mask distinctive effects on different types of claimants.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Considering that empirical research on the issue of race and civil justice has 
remained rare, and that our own research on Daubert measured overall effects 
on all litigants but could not tell us whether that was true for different 
communities, we decided to create a study to test and measure the effect of 
Daubert on communities of color.138 Our study would have a similar model to 
the original Daubert work, measuring the reaction of litigants to Daubert by 
assessing changes in case filing data, but would also incorporate demographic 
data from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
A. Summary of Results
Our analysis is intended to determine whether adoption of the Daubert 
evidentiary standard by the federal courts affected Black and White federal court 
filing rates differently. As we have shown previously, plaintiffs perceive the 
Daubert standard to be a stricter standard than the Frye standard it replaced in 
the federal and (many) state courts.139 As a result, when federal courts adopt 
Daubert in states that continue to utilize the older Frye standard, federal filing 
rates decrease as plaintiffs file in state courts with perceived lower evidentiary 
standards.140 Later, when states adopt Daubert as their evidentiary standard, we 
see a complete rebound in the federal filing rates as the disincentive to filing in 
federal court caused by the Daubert evidentiary barrier is removed.141 This 
effect can be seen in the following figure: 
                                                                                                                     
137 See Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 1002; Jurs & DeVito, CATH. U. L.
REV., supra note 6, at 701.
138 Because the effects of race can be conflated with the effects of poverty, our analysis 
includes variables relating to poverty as well as race.
139 Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 1003; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 131–136.
140 See Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 1000 (noting a twenty-one percent 
decline in the probability of filing in federal court).
141 See id. at 1001 (noting a 22% increase in the probability of filing in federal court).
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Figure 1: Effect of Adoption of Daubert
When examining the effect of Daubert through the lens of racial 
differences—how and if it affects Black and White plaintiffs differently—we 
expected to see a similar effect as for the population as a whole, but with a 
difference in the scale of impact for Black and White plaintiffs. We were correct 
that Daubert affected Blacks and Whites differently, but we were incorrect in 
assuming that the difference would simply be one of scale. 
Whenever one seeks to analyze whether one variable is correlated with 
another, one must be sure that there are no unexamined variables that might 
explain the correlation in whole or in part. In terms of looking at the interaction 
of Daubert adoption and race, we were concerned that any correlation found 
might be caused instead by differences in poverty. Currently, and during the 
period under study, on average Blacks have lower average incomes and a higher 
poverty rate than Whites.142 Our concern was that any difference we might find 
in Black and White filing rates relative to Daubert might actually be caused by 
differences in poverty rates. In essence, poorer populations might be affected 
differently than richer populations. Since Blacks are, on average, more likely to 
be in poverty than Whites, on average, this difference could produce results that 
lined up along racial lines even though the difference was actually one of 
poverty, not race. To avoid the possibility of drawing a mistaken conclusion, we 
included poverty rate in our regression formulas.
                                                                                                                     
142 See Historical Poverty Tables: People and Families - 1959 to 2016: Table 2. Poverty 
Status of People by Family Relationship, Race, and Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/tables/time-series/histori
cal-poverty-people/hstpov2.xls [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (listing poverty rate 
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We then found that the effect of Daubert was not race-neutral; rather, when 
the federal courts adopt Daubert, filing rates permanently decrease as the 
percentage of Blacks in the county increases—even after the state courts adopt 
Daubert. In precise opposition to this result, filing rates permanently increase 
as the percentage of Whites in the county increases. At the same time, for Blacks 
and Whites, as the poverty rate increases, so does the filing rate; although the 
effect is larger when holding percentage of Whites in a county constant than 
when holding percentage of Blacks in the county constant. We can see this effect 
in Table 1, which notes the percentage change in filing rates per 1,000 people 
in a county as each variable increases one percentage point:
Table 1: Effect of Adoption of Daubert on Tort Filing Rate in
Federal Court, by Race and Poverty Rate






Change in Filing 
Rate
-2.003% 0.040% 1.909% 0.045%
Daubert Adopted
By State Court, 
% Change in 
Filing Rate
-1.831% 0.072% 2.080% 0.080%
Figure 2, below, presents this information, relative to the percentage of 
Blacks and percentage of Whites in a population, in a chart form:
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Figure 2: Effect of Daubert on Filing Rate
From these results, we conclude that Daubert is racially harmful in its effect 
because it permanently removes Black litigants from the federal court system 
and permanently increases access for White litigants. 
B. The Datasets
Because we could find no existing dataset that combined census and federal
filing data, we were required to create a dataset to perform our analysis. This 
dataset has, at its core, data from the publicly available court-statistic database 
created by the NCSC and the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), which contains data 
relating to every case filed in federal court.143
The data we received from the FJC begins in 1960 and ends in 2012 and 
came in two separate files. The first file contained complete data from 1960 to 
1985. It also contained part of the 1986 data. The second file contained complete 
data from 1987 to 2012. It also contained part of the 1986 data. We first merged 
these files to give us a dataset that would cover the entire period 1980 to 2012. 
                                                                                                                     
143 See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR. INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOCIAL 
RESEARCH, ICPSR 3415, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 2001, Part 3: 
Civil Pending, 2001, 7 (2002) [hereinafter CIVIL TERMINATIONS] (defining the universe of 
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To do so, we created a new file that merged the data for 1986 from both files 
(eliminating duplicates). We then merged the first and second files replacing 
these two files’ data for the year 1986 with that from the third file we had 
created. This data was then limited to year of filing,144 county,145 nature of 
suit,146 and origin.147 Next, we limited the data to just those cases that were 
original proceedings in the court and over which the court had diversity 
jurisdiction. This gave us a “complete” database with filing information that we 
then merged with U.S. Census data to add variables for Black Population, White 
Population, and Total Population based upon the year of filing and associated 
County (FIPS) Code.148 This produced a dataset representing 1,400,857 discrete 
filings in federal court from the period 1980 to 2012. 
We next limited this dataset to torts filed in federal court using the nature of 
suit (“NOS”) variable keeping just the torts:
240 TORTS TO LAND
245 TORT PRODUCT LIABILITY
310 AIRPLANE PERSONAL INJURY
315 AIRPLANE PRODUCT LIABILITY
                                                                                                                     
144 The files do not have a variable for year; instead, they have a field called “filedate”
which is the “date on which the case was filed in the district.” CIVIL TERMINATIONS, supra
note 143, at 15 (defining “FILEDATE” as “[t]he DATE on which the case was filed in the 
district”) (emphasis in original). This field is in the format of day-month-year (e.g., “01 Jan 
1985”); see id. at 11 (describing location of FILEDATE variable in the files). We created a 
filing year variable by pulling out the filing year from the filedate variable.
145 Counties are “[t]he code for the county of residence of the first listed plaintiff.” Id.
at 19. Counties are identified using their Federal Information Processing Standards (“FIPS”)
code—a unique code that the federal government assigns to identify counties in the United 
States. See, e.g., 2010 FIPS Codes for Counties and County Equivalent Entities, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/codes/cou.html [https://perma.cc/667K-
5RYW]. A list of FIPS codes is available from the U.S. Census Bureau. See id. Filings with 
a county code of zero were eliminated because they could not be identified to a given county. 
Filings with an 88888 county code were also eliminated because they indicate that the case 
relates to a tract of land located within the U.S. but outside the home state. Finally, filings 
with a county code of 99999 were eliminated because they indicate that the case relates to a 
tract of land located outside of the United States. See CIVIL TERMINATIONS, supra note 143, 
at 19.
146 The nature of suit variable is “[a] 3 digit statistical code representing the nature of 
the action filed.” CIVIL TERMINATIONS, supra note 143, at 16. This includes foreclosure, torts 
to land, medical malpractice, etc. Id. at 16–17.
147 Origin is “[a] single digit code describing the manner in which the case was filed in 
the district.” Id. at 15. This includes whether the case was an original proceeding, removed, 
remanded, etc. Id.
148 This was more complicated than it seems at first glance as the publicly available 
census data is in different formats at different times. As a result, we had to create separate 
programs for data from 1980 to 1989, 1990 to 1991, 2000 to 2010, and 2011 to 2012. Because 
of the complexity of this exercise, we not only carefully reviewed the programs that produced 
the data, but we also verified the data by rewriting all programs to create the data twice from 
scratch. This ensured the accuracy of the data we used. 
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320 ASSAULT, LIBEL, AND SLANDER
330 FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY
340 MARINE PERSONAL INJURY
345 MARINE - PRODUCT LIABILITY
350 MOTOR VEHICLE PERSONAL INJURY
355 MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCT LIABILITY
360 OTHER PERSONAL INJURY
362 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
365 PERSONAL INJURY -PRODUCT LIABILITY
368 ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY - PROD.LIAB.
370 OTHER FRAUD
371 TRUTH IN LENDING
380 OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY DAMAGE
385 PROPERTY DAMAGE -PRODUCT LIABILTY149
This produced a dataset with 321,825 individual entries. We then took the 
individual filings file and created summary filings file for each year and FIPS 
code that contained the rate of federal filing per 1,000 people in the county 
(“RFT/1,000”), the percent of the population that was Black (“%Black”), and 
the percent of the population that was White (“%White”). This produced a file 
with 52,698 individual entries covering 3,135 FIPS counties for the years 1980 
to 2012. 
We then supplemented this dataset with poverty rates for each FIPS county 
from 1980 to 2012 using the following publicly available U.S. Census Bureau
datasets: 

















                                                                                                                     
149 See, e.g., CIVIL TERMINATIONS, supra note 143, at 16–18.
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2010 Poverty rates;
2011 Poverty rates; and
2012 Poverty rates.150
This enabled us to identify census data on poverty rate for every county in 
the United States for the years 1980, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994, and 1997–2012. 
Because the Census Bureau does not provide poverty-related census data for the 
years 1981–88, 1991, 1992, and 1994,151 we extrapolated the data for those 
years.152 These census datasets were combined to form a dataset that included 
three variables: FIPS code, year, and poverty rate. We then merged this dataset 
with our Daubert dataset so that for each filing we associated the appropriate 
poverty rate based on the FIPS code for the filing and the year of the filing.
C. The Fixed Effects Analysis 
In order to overcome the problem of heterogeneous populations,153 we used 
a fixed effects analysis to identify the correlations between RFT/1,000 and 
adoption of Daubert, and %Black or %White, and poverty rate (“PovRate”). 
Heterogeneous populations make statistical analysis difficult because they can 
mask the true cause of changes to the dependent variable.154 For example, a 
correlation may be caused by the treatment (adoption of Daubert) or by the 
differences in the populations (highly urban Manhattan, New York compared 
with highly rural Trail County, North Dakota).155 Even if we believe we have 
properly selected homogeneous populations, it is always possible that the 
populations are heterogeneous due to some unknown variable.156
                                                                                                                     
150 See Poverty Data Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/data/tables.All.html
[https://perma.cc/48S9-W7JF] (providing links to poverty data).
151 One of us, DeVito, confirmed this through a conversation with a member of the 
Poverty Branch of the U.S. Census Bureau on Oct. 2, 2017. See also Poverty Data Tables,
supra note 150.
152 For example, we had the data for 1990 and 1993. We calculated povertyrate1991 = 
povertyrate1990 – ((povertyrate1990-povertyrate1993)/3); we calculated povertyrate1992 = 
povertyrate1990 + (2*((povertyrate1993-povertyrate1990)/3)).
153 Populations that differ relative to one or more statistically relevant factors are called 
“heterogeneous.” See, e.g., RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 32–33 (9th ed. 
1971) (discussing the problem of heterogeneity in the context of pairing and grouping); 
DAMODAR GUJARATI, ECONOMETRICS BY EXAMPLE 5 (2011) (discussing the problem of 
heterogeneity); MYOUNG-JAE LEE, MICRO-ECONOMETRICS FOR POLICY, PROGRAM, AND 
TREATMENT EFFECTS 9–10 (2005) (discussing causal inference as compared to statistical 
association).
154 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 153, at 18.
155 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 153, at 32–33; GUJARATI, supra note 153, at 5; LEE,
supra note 153, at 9–10 (discussing causal inference as compared to statistical association).
156 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 153, at 18 (discussing the impossibility in any experiment 
of making the various test populations identical in all relevant respects).
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One way to address heterogeneity is to use a randomized, controlled 
experiment.157 For example, we would begin by identifying a set of states A–G
and recording the values of all of the relevant variables relating to those states 
at time t. We would then randomly assign each state to either treatment (adopt 
Daubert) or control (retain current evidentiary standard), and record the values 
for the relevant variables each subsequent year until time t′.
As is obvious from our example, for many studies a controlled, randomized 
experiment is not feasible, physically possible, or ethically permissible. One 
way to avoid these difficulties, and limit the effect of heterogeneous 
populations, is to use a quasi-experimental study (a study that specifically lacks 
the element of random assignment to treatment or control).158 We utilize a quasi-
experimental fixed-effects analysis that combines before-after analysis, 
matching, and the use of dummy variables to minimize the potential for 
heterogeneity to produce misleading results.
In “before-after” analysis, we isolate the effect of treatment, within the same 
group, by measuring the dependent variable (filing rate) before and after 
treatment is given.159 The problem with a before-after analysis is that there might 
be some unknown covariate that changes over time within the population that 
affects the dependent variable.160
In “matching,” we compare two populations that we believe are 
homogeneous relative to the dependent variable. For example, if North Dakota 
and South Dakota had populations that were, in all relevant ways, identical, we 
would introduce the treatment (adoption of Daubert) in South Dakota but not 
North Dakota, and then compare the rate of filing between those two states.161
For matching to be effective we must have two comparable populations162 with 
the same covariate values,163 and that is not always easy to know because there 
is a risk that there is some unknown variable that explains the result.164
Combining before-after analysis with matching addresses many of the 
problems of each individual approach.165 Nonetheless, we are left with the 
problem of finding comparable populations. To limit that problem, we can 
                                                                                                                     
157 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN, THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF QUASI-
EXPERIMENTS 1–2 (1986) (discussing randomized, controlled experiments).
158 See id. at 2–5.
159 See LEE, supra note 153, at 64–65. 
160 See id. at 65, 79, 99.
161 See id. at 79, 99.
162 James J. Heckman et al., Matching as an Econometric Estimator, 65 REV. ECON.
STUD. 261, 261 (1998). Two populations are “comparable” if both populations “would have 
experienced the same outcomes . . . had they participated in the programme.” Id. at 262. A 
central difficulty with matching is ensuring that the two groups are comparable. Id.
163 See LEE, supra note 153, at 79.
164 See id. at 88–90; FISHER, supra note 153, at 32.
165 See LEE, supra note 153, at 65, 79, 99.
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engage in a fixed-effects regression analysis using dummy variables166 to 
account for unknown variables.167
Our Daubert analysis is comprised of two sub-analyses. Each of these 
analyses required slightly different fixed-effects regression formulas. The first 
formula (“Flight to Frye”) was used to analyze the effect of federal adoption of 
Daubert in states that did not have a Daubert standard and took the form:
where is the rate of filing per 1,000 people in FIPS county i
and year t;
is the y intercept;
FDt is a binary variable set to 1 if the federal courts have adopted Daubert
at time t;
is the correlation coefficient for FDt variable;
is a binary variable set to 1 if the state courts in state i have adopted 
Daubert at time t;
is the correlation coefficient for the variable;
is the percent of FIPS county i in year t that are Black (when 
regressing on Black) or White (when regressing on White);
is the correlation coefficient for the variable;
is the percent of FIPS county i in year t that falls below the 
Poverty Rate;
is the correlation coefficient for the variable;
                                                                                                                     
166 Dummy variables are variables that have a value of 1 if a condition is met and a value 
of 0 otherwise. GUJARATI, supra note 153, at 47. In our case we created one dummy variable 
for each year and for each state. So we would have Dummy_Alabama, Dummy_Alaska, etc. 
and Dummy_1983, Dummy_1984, etc.
167 See LEE, supra note 153, at 79 (noting that difference-in-differences analyses “can 
deal with unobserved confounders to some extent”); see also Jurs & DeVito, CATH. U. L.
REV., supra note 6, at 716–23 (discussing that “difference-in-differences” models are a 
special case of fixed effect analysis). 
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is a set of binary dummy variables such that is set to 1 when i is 1 
(the state is Alabama) and to 0 otherwise, is set to 1 when i is 2 (the state 
is Alaska) and to 0 otherwise, etc.;
is the correlation coefficient for the variable;
is a set of binary dummy variables such that is set to 1 when t = 1 
(the year is 1983) and to 0 otherwise, is set to 1 when t = 2 (the year is 
1984) and to 0 otherwise, etc.;
is the regression coefficient for the variable. 
The second Daubert analysis (“Return to Federal Court”) was used to 
analyze the effect of state adoption of Daubert in states that adopted a Daubert
standard after the federal courts. The Return to Federal Court analysis used the 
same regression formula as the Flight to Frye analysis but did not contain the 
FDt binary variable nor its correlation coefficient .
D. The Results—Daubert
Our analysis of the effect of Daubert on filing rates was broken into two 
interrelated pieces. First, we examined the relationship between RFT/1,000 and 
race, in the context of federal court adoption of Daubert, looking at states that 
had not adopted Daubert during the period when the federal courts had first 
adopted Daubert. This required taking the Daubert dataset and limiting it to a 
seven year period surrounding 1993 (the year Daubert was adopted by the 
federal courts). We then limited our analysis to thirteen states whose state courts 
either had a Frye standard for the entire duration168 or that adopted Daubert after 
1993.169 Because the year that a court adopted Daubert was likely to be a 
confusing year, we eliminated the entire year 1993 and, for each state that 
adopted Daubert subsequent to 1993, we eliminated, for just that state, the year 
of adoption. Finally, for any state that adopted Daubert during the study period 
but after 1993, we eliminated the data for any year that state had a Daubert 
standard.
Our expectation was that in those states where the federal court adopted 
Daubert while the state did not, we would see a decrease in RFT/1,000 as people 
fled from federal court (and the stricter Daubert standard) to state court (with 
the less strict state standard). Our results, relative to the adoption of Daubert,
were consistent with that expectation as the correlation coefficient for federal 
                                                                                                                     
168 Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and 
Washington. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 129, at 493.
169 Alaska (1999), Connecticut (1997), Indiana (1995), North Carolina (1995), and 
Tennessee (1997). Id.
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adoption of Daubert was negatively correlated with RFT/1,000.170 At the same 
time, we found that Daubert was not racially neutral in its effect. There was a 
statistically significant negative correlation between the RFT/1,000 and 
%Black, and a statistically significant positive correlation between RFT/1,000 
and %White. In addition, there was a statistically significant positive correlation 
between RFT/1,000 and poverty rate regardless of race.
The use of correlation coefficients, while useful in building a model, is often 
not helpful in itself in understanding the impact of an independent variable 
(adoption of Daubert, race, poverty rate) on the dependent variable (federal 
filing rate). To clarify this impact, it is helpful to have a context. For our 
purposes, it will be instructive to focus on average RFT/1,000 for the counties 
and years under study so that we can “see” the size of the impact of our 
independent variables on federal tort filing rates. For this portion of the analysis 
(Flight to Frye), the average RFT/1,000 for the counties and years studied was 
0.0710201. In essence, there were, on average, 0.0710201 federal court tort 
filings for each 1,000 people in those counties during the study period. 
Our fixed effects analysis found a statistically significant171 negative 
correlation of -0.0014223 between %Black and RFT/1,000. This means for each 
1% increase in the percentage of Blacks in a county, we have a 2% decrease in 
the filing rate. Poverty rate was also statistically significant172 with a positive 
correlation coefficient of 0.000028306. This means that, holding %Black 
constant, for every 1% increase in the poverty rate in a county we see a 0.04% 
increase in the federal filings per 1,000 people in the county.
The results for %White were the opposite to those for %Black. We found a 
statistically significant173 positive correlation coefficient of 0.0013558 between 
%White and RFT/1,000. This means we have a 1.9% increase for each 1% 
increase in Whites in the county. Once again, poverty rate was statistically 
significant174 with positive correlation coefficient of, in this instance, 
0.000032009. Thus, holding %White constant, for every 1% increase in the 
poverty rate in a county we see a 0.05% increase in the federal filings per 1,000 
people in the county.
On their face, these results are troubling. Federal adoption of Daubert, in 
states with a Frye standard, negatively impacts Black plaintiffs’ access to the 
federal courts, while positively impacting White plaintiffs’ access to the federal 
courts. 
In the second part of our Daubert analysis, we examined the effects of states 
adopting Daubert after the federal courts. This required taking the Daubert
dataset and limiting it to a nine-year period starting in 1994 (the year after 
Daubert was adopted by the federal courts) and ending in 2002. We then limited 
                                                                                                                     
170 The correlation coefficient for federal adoption of Daubert, in this analysis, was -
6.07x10-3.
171 The p-value was < 0.0005.
172 The p-value was < 0.0005.
173 The p-value was < 0.0005.
174 The p-value was < 0.0005.
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to thirteen states whose state courts either had a Frye standard for the entire 
duration175 or that adopted Daubert after 1993.176
Our expectation was that there would be an increase in RFT/1,000 in those 
states that adopted Daubert as the state court evidentiary standard because the 
pressure to avoid federal court exerted by the stricter Daubert standard would 
be relieved as both courts now used the same standard. Our results relative to 
the state adoption of Daubert is consistent with this as state adoption is 
positively correlated with RFT/1,000.177 But relative to %White, %Black, and 
poverty rate, we do not see the same kind of rebound that we had seen in our 
previous study. 
It is, once again, useful to use the average federal filing rate per 1,000 people 
as a context for understanding our results. For this set of counties during the 
study period the average RFT/1,000 is 0.0701518. 
Rather than a rebound in %Black, where the correlation coefficient would 
be positive or of a similar magnitude to the correlation coefficient in the Flight 
to Frye analysis, we found a statistically significant178 negative correlation of -
0.00128 between %Black and RFT/1,000. This corresponds to a 1.83% decrease 
in federal filing rates for each 1% increase in Blacks in the county. Poverty rate 
was, once again, statistically significant179 with a positive correlation coefficient 
of 0.000050598. This means that, holding %Black constant, for every 1% 
increase in the poverty rate in a county we see a 0.07% increase in the federal 
filings per 1,000 people in the county.
This result is concerning because it entails that the suppression of Black 
federal filing rates correlated with the federal adoption of Daubert, noted above,
does not go away with state adoption of Daubert. In our previous work (that did 
not look at race as a factor), we saw a return of federal tort filing rates to pre-
Daubert levels once the state courts adopted Daubert.180 Here this does not 
occur—in a race neutral world, we would expect all of that suppression to have 
been eliminated.
Things are markedly worse, for a race neutral world, when we examine the 
effect of state adoption of Daubert on %White where we found a statistically 
significant181 positive correlation coefficient of 0.001459058 between %White 
and RFT/1,000. Thus, for each 1% increase in Whites in a county, we have a 
2.08% increase in the federal filing rates. Poverty rate was, once again, 
                                                                                                                     
175 Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and 
Washington. See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 129, at 493.
176 Alaska (1999), Connecticut (1997), Indiana (1995), North Carolina (1995), and 
Tennessee (1997). Id.
177 We used the binary variable “SD” to measure the effect of adoption of Daubert by 
the state courts, after the federal courts had adopted Daubert, on federal filing rates. Holding 
%Black constant, the correlation coefficient for SD was 0.026382. Holding %White 
constant, the correlation coefficient for SD was 0.026786.
178 The p-value was < 0.0005.
179 The p-value was 0.006.
180 Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 977.
181 The p-value was 0.002.
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statistically significant182 with a positive correlation coefficient of 0.000056235. 
This means that, holding %White constant, for every 1% increase in the poverty 
rate in a county we see a 0.09% increase in the federal filings per 1,000 people 
in the county. Once again, in a race neutral world, we would expect White 
federal tort filing rates to return to their pre-Daubert levels. The fact that the 
correlation coefficient increases (compared to the Flight to Frye states) is 
troubling, to say the least.
Table 2: Effect of the Adoption of Daubert on Tort Filing Rate in Federal and
State Court, Controlling for Poverty Rate
 
Base Filing 
Rate per 1,000 
People
Effect of Change 
on White 
Population (% 
Change per 1% 
increase)
Effect of Change 
on Black 
Population (% 















From the foregoing analysis we conclude that adoption of Daubert has a 
negative impact on Black federal tort filing rates and a positive impact on White 
federal tort filing rates simpliciter. In essence, something about the Daubert
standard pushes Blacks out of federal courts permanently and opens the door for 
more Whites in federal courts permanently.
E. Coherence of This Result with Previous Findings on Daubert
We have previously shown that federal court adoption of Daubert in states 
that had an older Frye (or other non-Daubert) standard resulted in an overall 
decrease in filings in federal courts.183 In that analysis, we did not analyze the 
impact of race on filing rates. In our current work, we demonstrate that federal 
adoption of Daubert produces a permanent increase in filing rates for Whites 
and a permanent decrease in filing rates for Blacks. This appears 
contradictory—in essence, how can there be a permanent increase in White 
filing rates and a decrease in filing rates overall when Whites make up the largest 
portion of the population?
                                                                                                                     
182 The p-value was 0.006.
183 See Jurs & DeVito, ARK. L. REV., supra note 6, at 977.
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To explain this apparent contradiction, we must first return to our fixed 
effects regression formula:
As we have previously shown, the correlation coefficient for FD (Federal 
adoption of Daubert) remains negative as plaintiffs flee to the less strict Frye
standard and the correlation coefficient for SD (State adoption of Daubert after
Federal adoption) is positive as plaintiffs return to federal court because the 
impediment of the stricter standard is removed.
At the same time, the correlation coefficient for %Blacks (PerRace looking 
at percentage reporting as Black) is negative. This means that as the percentage 
of Blacks increase, then that change will have a negative effect on the filing rate. 
(In our population, the mean percentage of Blacks is 6.7%.) Because the 
coefficients for %Black and FD are negative, that means those two variables can 
have an overall negative effect on the filing rate. For example, if we graph the 
filing rate starting with no federal adoption of Daubert, later federal adoption, 
then an increase from 6.7% of the population Black to 7.7% we see a negative 
effect on the filing rate because both FD and %Black have negative correlation 
coefficients. 
Figure 3: Increase of One Percentage Point in %Black
The correlation coefficient for %Whites (PerRace looking at percentage 

















Increase in Percentage 
Black from 6.7% to 7.7%
Federal Courts Adopt Daubert
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the population increases, there will be an increase in filing rates correlated to 
that increase. Because the effect of FD is negative, the combined effect of the 
two variables (ignoring the effects of any others in the regression equation) will 
be overall negative if there is decrease in %White and will be either positive or 
negative depending on how big an increase there is in %White. In Figure 4 
below, we see that a one percentage point increase from the median (91.2%) 
percentage White in our population, results in an overall negative effect of FD 
and %White. 
Figure 4: Increase of One Percentage Point in %White
In addition, as Figure 5 below shows, a one percentage point decrease from 
the median (91.2%) percentage White in our population, results in an overall 
negative effect of FD and %White.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Time
Increase in Percentage 
White from 91.2% to 92.2%
Federal Courts Adopt Daubert
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Figure 5: Decrease of One Percentage Point in %White
In reality, the downward trajectory of the filing rate occurs at the same time 
as the original effect of Daubert. As a result, our data demonstrates that these 
changes based on %Black and %White occurred at the time of the original 
decision.
IV. DISCUSSION
Based on our analysis, Daubert gatekeeping does not act equally towards 
all claimants in the civil justice system, but instead acts disproportionately to 
limit access to justice for communities of color. In response to the federal 
adoption of Daubert in 1993, our previous work has shown a phenomenon we 
called “Flight to Frye,” as claimants leave a venue with a higher burden for 
evidence for an alternative venue with a lower burden.184 Our data shows that 
in response to this change, filing rates among black claimants drop significantly 
while rates among white claimants actually rise.185 How can we explain that 
result?
A. Explanations for the Disproportionate Impact on Claimants of Color
One major consideration clearly involves economic valuation of claims. 
When an attorney evaluates a potential case, the attorney must give a case a 
prospective value based on both the “likelihood of recovery” and also “damage 
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award after recovery.”186 Should a legal change modify the likelihood of 
recovery, then the case becomes less desirable for the attorney. The same is true 
of a claim with exactly the same evidence but lower potential damages. When 
Daubert acts as a stricter standard, it reduces the likelihood of recovery for all 
claimants, and by so doing, will necessarily change an attorney’s valuation of 
any prospective case. We believe that this reduction in “likelihood of recovery”
after Daubert changes some claims—those with lower economic damages—
from “borderline yes” to “borderline no” cases for the prospective attorneys. 
When one considers that black Americans have a higher proportion of the 
population living in poverty and that the median income of the group is lower 
than white Americans, the change in case valuation by prospective attorneys—
purely from an economic perspective—would disproportionately affect 
claimants of color.187
We believe the effect cannot be solely related to income distribution, 
however. Survey data consistently shows black respondents are less likely to 
believe they are being treated fairly in the justice system, and all respondents 
believe people of color are treated worse.188 It is not hard to see why. In their 
seminal study on civil justice in Cook County, Chin and Peterson found that 
claimants of color were less likely to win a recovery of any sort, and even if they 
won, they received 26% smaller damage awards than white claimants.189 If these 
findings are consistent with the civil justice system today, attorneys evaluating 
a claim from a potential client of color may also be reducing the “likelihood of 
recovery,” independent of the income valuation component of the calculation. 
This can also push some cases from “borderline yes” to “borderline no,” again 
negatively affecting communities of color. 
Whether it is based on crass calculations of “likelihood of success” based 
on perceptions of recovery within a flawed civil justice system, adoption of 
Daubert in federal court pushed people of color out of the civil justice system, 
disproportionately as compared to white claimants. 
The disproportionate effect of Daubert may have been mitigated, after 1993, 
by adoption of the same standard in state court. Our previous work has shown 
that after 1993, when a state adopted Daubert for evaluation of evidence in state 
court, there was a “return to federal court” effect where claim levels returned to 
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the status quo prior to 1993.190 Yet, after analyzing these data, we found that 
even after a state adopts Daubert, claims by people of color remain significantly 
below their pre-1993 levels.191 We believe this demonstrates that once excluded, 
claimants of color are unlikely to return to the civil justice system. 
We thought about why claims do not return to their status quo, and have two 
possible explanations. First, a prospective attorney’s valuation of a particular 
claim will continue to incorporate the reduction in the “likelihood of success”
prong of the calculation because although there is an equilibrium for the 
admissibility standard for the two venues, the equilibrium occurs with the 
stricter standard. This is different than a situation where a law is adopted, but 
later is overturned; in that situation, equilibrium is also reached but at the 
original standard.
Secondly, the reduction in filings may not respond to new changes in law 
because once prospective attorneys react to the initial change in law—in this 
case the adoption of the stricter Daubert standard—by modifying their practice 
to the “new normal,” they may not be willing or able to return to the previous 
practice model even if the law changes again. We documented this effect in a 
prior paper discussing tort reform efforts.192 In that piece, we found that 
adoption of a noneconomic damages cap reduced the filing rate of claims from 
what it otherwise would have been without the cap.193 One would expect that 
result. However, when we examined the effect of nullification of noneconomic 
damages caps, we were surprised to see that the nullification of the cap had no 
statistically-significant effect on filings; there was no “uptick” at all.194 In fact, 
for medical malpractice claims, we found that after nullification of the damages 
cap, filing rates continued to decline even further.195 We believe the Daubert
admissibility standard has a similar effect on claimants of color, and in that 
regard has effects identical to tort reform. 
B. Responses for Consideration
Whether these explanations play all, some, or none of the role in the 
disproportionate impact of the Daubert standard on communities of color, we 
believe the impact of the rule—combined with similar effects within the civil 
justice system—have led to a crisis of legitimacy within that system. It is not 
hard to imagine why state commission reports consistently show survey 
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responses from communities of color reporting mistrust, mistreatment, 
disrespect, and disadvantage in dealings with the law.196
The issue of race is, of course, not an easy one, and any suggestion for 
reform will only provide some of the necessary response to mitigate historical 
wrongs. But we believe the best approach is the most straightforward one: when 
considering future changes to fundamental rules within the civil justice 
system—whether substantive, procedural, evidentiary, or otherwise—we must 
consciously and directly consider the impact of that change on communities of 
color prior to adoption. We would not expect the impact on communities of 
color to be the only major consideration in legal reform, but it certainly cannot 
be pushed aside either. Too long we have predicted that legal changes would 
affect all people similarly, but we believe that our study, along with other similar 
work, has shown these changes can disproportionately impact some groups. We 
should know whether that is true, before legal reform measures are adopted.
We have at least one example of efforts to expose disproportionate impacts 
leading to consideration of reform. In her work, Professor Chamallas showed 
how use of race or gender specific tables for economic damages calculations led 
to reductions in recoveries,197 while Professor Avraham shows how these 
damage reductions can lead to perverse incentives.198 In response, each 
suggested the same reform: use of blended or mixed tables for determination of 
tort damages.199 Whether all judges follow this advice, certainly some judges 
now can see that a seemingly neutral rule—that damages should reflect the 
actual loss expected by the individual claimant—can have disproportionate and 
negative impacts on minority or female claimants. In response, Avraham notes 
that Judge Weinstein in New York now requires blended tables.200
We propose that instead of waiting until a disproportionate and negative 
effect can be measured, usually requiring waiting years for data to arrive, we 
explicitly make these considerations prior to major law reform. 
C. Suggestions for Future Research
Helland and Tabarrok wrote in 2003 that “[i]t is odd that so little attention 
has been paid to the role of race and poverty in the American tort system”201
while in 2008, Cardi noted that “existing scholarship only scratches the surface 
of this important topic.”202 We agree with these and other authors who lament 
the paucity of research into race and the civil justice system. Clearly, our efforts 
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on evaluating Daubert and its impact on communities of color only scratch the 
surface of the research needed for comprehensive evaluation of fairness within 
the civil justice system. Where to start?
Even within the area of scientific admissibility and Daubert, work remains 
to be done. In our research model, we combined case filing data and census data 
in order to evaluate the impact of Daubert on case filings within communities 
of color.203 However, the analysis relies on the following assumption, one that 
has also affected researchers like Helland and Tabarrok:204 when using 
aggregate data, one must assume that the racial makeup of claimants within a 
district generally reflects the racial composition of the district as a whole. As in 
any empirical research, more precise data could eliminate the necessity for this 
assumption, reasonable though it may be.
Beyond the Daubert arena, research into case filing rates could also evaluate 
a variety of other legal changes. We have, in prior work, evaluated the case filing
effects of tort reform, finding that it acts as intended to reduce claims.205 Clearly, 
a researcher could use these tools to evaluate the effect of tort reform on 
communities of color or women, as some have already started to do,206 in order 
to see if theorists are correct that they bear disproportionate impacts of tort 
reform measures. Once the research method is clear, the same approach can be 
used to measure the impact of any past change to the law, even something as 
benign as the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity 
jurisdiction. 
We therefore believe that empirical research into legal changes in the civil 
justice system is sorely lacking, needed, and once used, can provide important 
insight into disproportionate impacts of seemingly neutral law reforms.
V. CONCLUSION
Civil justice reform efforts, even seemingly neutral or necessary reforms, 
can and sometimes do, hide nasty disproportionate effects on specific 
subcategories of claimants, particularly people of color. In an earlier series of
papers, our empirical analysis of Daubert’s overall effect showed that both civil 
plaintiffs and civil defendants act in ways that demonstrate that Daubert is 
stricter. Yet this broader finding, we now have discovered, masked other effects; 
in fact, Daubert did not have one effect on all claimants, it disproportionately 
and negatively affects claimants of color. Our analysis shows that Daubert
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resulted in fewer claims by black claimants, and that once the claimants are out 
of the system, they stay out.
Troubling as this finding may be, our hope is that exposing this and other 
discriminatory effects within the civil justice system will lead to efforts within 
the system to proactively evaluate disparate impacts prior to future reforms. 
Such efforts would enhance the fairness of the civil justice system, and act in 
concert with similarly minded criminal justice reform measures to improve the 
legitimacy of the judicial system overall. A nation committed to equal justice 
under law should expect no less.

